In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism —as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive (...) processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems. Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism.. (shrink)

Among the works on ethics in the Aristotelian corpus, there is no serious dispute among scholars that the "Eudemian Ethics "is authentic. The "Eudemian Ethics "is" "increasingly read and used by scholars as a useful support and confirmation and sometimes contrast to the "Nicomachean Ethics." Yet, it remains a largely neglected work in the study of Aristotle's ethics, both among scholars and moral philosophers. Peter L. P. Simpson provides an analytical outline of the entire work together with summaries of (...) each individual section, making the overall structure and detailed argument clear. His translation and explanatory notes include the common books that the "Eudemian" "Ethics" shares with the "Nicomachean." This translation contains renderings of words and phrases, and proposals for emending the text that differ from what other translators and scholars have adopted. This translation is literal, without expansion or paraphrase, and yet also readable. A readable but literal translation is necessary because in the "Eudemian Ethics," more than usual in Aristotle's writings, the logic of the argumentation can turn on the peculiar wording or order. Simpson explains the argumentation where necessary in notes and separate explanatory comments. This book is a fresh, twenty-first-century rendition of the work of one of the most eminent philosophers of all time. (shrink)

It has been maintained that we are quite able to express (1*)–(4*) without the introduction of a dyadic deontic operator, provided only that we supply our standard deontic logic with a stronger conditional than material implication. The lesson learned from Chisholm's paradox has been the eminently convincing, indeed obvious, one: that what we ought to do is not determined by what is the case in some perfect world, but by what is the case in the best world we can ‘get (...) to’ from this world. What we ought to do depends upon how we are circumstanced. (shrink)

The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for (...) each person-concept. In Study 2, 335 adults rated the previously generated descriptors by how characteristic each was of the target person-concept. In Study 3, 344 adults sorted the descriptors by similarity for each person-concept. By comparing and contrasting the three person-concepts, a complex portrait of an intellectually humble person emerges with particular epistemic, self-oriented, and other-oriented dimensions. (shrink)

This paper began with the simple object of finding an account that allowed us to compare incompatible false theories. This we achieved with ρ. But that relation is language — or interest — dependent. ρ' is free from this limitation; though thus liberated it is perhaps rather unconcerned about what is true, and further fails to deliver certain intuitive comparisons. Whether ρ is to be preferred to ρ' or vice versa, seems to me a largely fruitless question: In fact it (...) might be that as we seek to free the idea of verisimilitude from any dependence on language, interests or problems, so we gradually collapse it to nothing more than logical power. (shrink)

Aus dem Zusammentreffen der Philosophischen Anthropologie mit der interdisziplinären Rhetorikforschung sind heute zwei neue komplementäre Tochterdisziplinen entstanden. Die eine ist die fundamentalrhetorische Anthropologie, welche den Menschen generell als homo rhetoricus definiert. Die andere klärt als rhetorische Metakritik die Philosophie selbst über ihre eigene, immanente Rhetorizität auf. Der vorliegende Band präsentiert exemplarische Beiträge zu diesem neuen rhetorischen Denken in zwei Teilen. Der erste enthält unter dem Titel „Zur Philosophie der Rhetorik“ die Arbeiten zur fundamentalrhetorischen Anthropologie. Ausgehend von grundlegenden Thesen zur Homo-rhetoricus-Anthropologie (...) behandeln sie Themen wie z.B. Pithanologie, Pathelogie, Polypersonalität, Anthropotechnik, Autoinvenienz oder die Rekonstruktion des Subjektbegriffes durch interne Rhetorik. Der zweite Teil „Zur Rhetorik der Philosophie“ umfasst die Beiträge, welche der rhetorischen Metakritik der Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte zuzurechnen sind. Hier finden sich u.a. Abhandlungen zur Topographie der klassischen Metaphysik und ihren sophistischen und pararhetorischen Gegenspielern sowie metakritische Detailstudien zu Pseudo-Longin, Kant, Hegel, Fichte und Heidegger. (shrink)

In this follow up to The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, Peter L. P. Simpson centers his attention on the basics of Aristotelian moral doctrine as found in the Great Ethics: the definition of happiness, the nature and kind of the virtues, pleasure, and friendship. This work's authenticity is disputed, but Simpson argues that all the evidence favors it. Unlike the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle wrote the Great Ethics for a popular audience. It gives us insight less into Aristotle (...) the theoretician than into Aristotle the pedagogue. For this reason, the Great Ethics has distinct advantages as an introduction to Aristotelian ethical thinking: it is simpler and clearer in its argumentation, matters such as the intellectual virtues are made suitably secondary to the practical focus, the moral virtues come through with a pleasing directness, and the work's syllogistic formalism gives it a transparency and accessibility that the other Ethics typically lack. Arius' Epitome, which relies heavily on this work, helps confirm its value and authenticity. Because the Great Ethics is generally neglected by scholars, less has been done to clear up its obscurities or to expose its structure. But to ignore it is to lose another and more instructive way of approaching and appreciating Aristotle's teaching. The translation is prefaced by an analytic outline of the whole, and the several sections of it are prefaced by brief summaries. The commentary supplies fuller descriptions and analyses, sorting out puzzles, removing misunderstandings, and resolving doubts of meaning and intention. This book is a fresh rendition of the work of the preeminent philosopher of all time. (shrink)

Participants of low and high hypnotic susceptibility were tested on a temporal order judgement task, both with and without hypnosis. Judgements were made of the order of presentation of light flashes appearing in first one hemi-field then the other. There were differences in the inter-stimulus intervals required accurately to report the order, depending upon which hemi-field led. This asymmetry was most marked in hypnotically susceptible participants and reversed when they were hypnotised. This implies not only that brain activity changes in (...) hypnosis, but also that there is a difference in brain function between people of low and high hypnotic susceptibility. The latter exhibited a faster-acting left hemisphere in the waking state, but faster right when hypnotised. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this paper we examine how ethical values contribute to national economic prosperity. We extend the concept of an ethical wealth of nations first introduced by Donaldson in which he proposed four categories of ethical values—fairer distribution of goods, better government, ingrained social cooperation, and inculcation of economic duties—that can drive economic performance, but only if citizens ascribe “intrinsic value” to them independent of their economic interests. Our analysis draws on institutional economics and sociology research to show that if ethical (...) values are to drive economic performance, they must also be supported by the institutional fabric of the nation. We embed an expanded set of ethical values in a set of democratic, free market and civil society institutions spanning three sectors of society—political, economic and cultural respectively. We conclude by discussing the implications of our institutional framework for moral education. (shrink)

»daß der Philosophiebegriff Fichtes viel weiter ausholt, als bisher gesehen wurde: er ist nicht nur der Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre in sich, sondern zugleich auch der Begriff der Vermittlung von Philosophie und Leben«.

In den letzten Jahren hat die Wiederentdeckung der öffentlichen Philosophie Fichtes, die in den drei großen Berliner Vortragszyklen Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Anweisung zum seligen Leben und Reden an die deutsche Nation kulminieren, zu einer neuen Sicht der Gesamtgestalt und des Ursprungsproblems der Wissenschaftslehre geführt. Diese veränderte Sicht der Philosophie Fichtes, läßt sich auf fünf Entdeckungen fokussieren. Sie bilden insgesamt die Stationen einer Entdeckungsgeschichte, die das Ursprungsproblem und die Gesamtgestalt der Fichteschen Philosophie in einem neuen Licht erscheinen läßt.

‚Quer‘ is the keyword for our new effort to interpret ‚der ganze Fichte‘. The first part of our contribution presents Johann Gottlieb Fichte as a rebellious philosopher of strong subjectivity. With his prominent figures of the i, the nation and the savant, he also stands crosswise against his own contemporary time, the history of his reception and our contemporary time. The second part of this study considers Fichtes theory of death as a counterpart of the usual interpretation of the Wissenschaftslehre (...) as a theory of life. Different manifestation of death – from physical death to the death of the Wissenschaftslehre – are systematically analyzed.‚Quer‘ bildet das Stichwort für unseren Versuch, den ‚ganzen Fichte‘ auf eine neue Art und Weise zu deuten. Der erste Teil unseres Beitrages exponiert Johann Gottlieb Fichte als rebellischen Denker starker Subjektivität. Mit seinen prominenten Gedankenfiguren des Ich, der Nation und des philosophischen Gelehrten steht er demnach sowohl ‚quer‘ gegen seine Zeit, als auch gegen seine Rezeptionsgeschichte sowie gegen unsere zeitgenössische Gegenwart. Im zweiten Teil wird gegen die rezeptionsgeschichtlich dominante Lebenslehre Fichtes deren antithetischer Gegenspieler, der Tod, in den Blick genommen. Hier wird versucht, Fichtes Verständnis des Todes und dessen Erscheinungsformen – vom physischen Tod bis zum Tod der Wissenschaftslehre – in einem systematischen Ansatz zu durchdenken. (shrink)

In his famous Addresses of the German Nation Fichte gives a number of different definitions of German identity. Ironically, precisely those figures of German dominance, which played an important role in the German nationalism of the 19th and 20th century, come from the Romanesque abroad. Fichte follows here Dante’s philosophy of the vernacular and the invention of the typical German virtues in the Germania of Tacitus. Tragically, however Fichte’s own cosmopolitan queer theory of transnational intersubjectivity has been overlooked until now.In (...) Fichtes berühmten Reden an die deutsche Nation lassen sich eine Mehrzahl unterschiedlicher Definitionsfiguren deutscher Identität entdecken. Ironischerweise schöpfen dabei ausgerechnet die für den Nationalismus des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts zentralen Figuren deutscher Dominanz aus den historischen Quellen des romanischen Auslandes. Dazu zählen Dantes Philosophie der Volkssprache und Tacitus’ Erfindung des germanischen Nationalcharakters in seiner Germania. Am Ende gehört es auch zur tragischen Ironie der Wirkungsgeschichte, dass Fichtes eigenes, neuartiges und kosmopolitisches Quer-Konzept transnationaler Intersubjektivität bis heute übersehen wird. (shrink)

The income and careers that come with building wind turbines have become a lifeline for many factory towns and farming communities. Generating electricity from the wind puts increasingly cheap power on the grid, saving consumers billions a year. And it is one of the biggest, fastest, cheapest ways to reduce carbon pollution, reducing the threat of climate change. Yet as wind farms have rapidly spread to forty‐one states, their developers must make their case anew with each community that hosts them. (...) Facts matter, but so do empathy, honoring deep connections to neighbors and landscape, and developing mutual respect. Successful wind farm developers listen first for shared values and speak with inclusive language, to communicate with potential opponents across divides of misunderstanding and motivate local residents to adapt to and benefit from change. (shrink)

Pope John Paul II's opposition to the Iraq War was not that it failed to meet the conditions of Just War Theory. Indeed, we cannot tell from what he publicly said whether he thought it met those conditions or not, for he would have opposed it in any case. His thinking was rather that even just and necessary wars always come, as it were, too late, and are never able to solve the problems that made wars just and necessary. He (...) was not trying therefore to enter into the details of Just War Theory. He wanted to subsume the principles of war into the principles of peace and to do so, not by denying justice, but by transcending it with charity. This article shows how this thinking is to be understood and the many means the Pope devised for putting this thinking into practice. (shrink)

Aristotle's Ethica Eudemia Book 2 Chapter 2 contains, at lines 1220b10–11, a well-known crux in the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις. The context makes clear that Aristotle is using this phrase to refer to some writing or other, but scholars have been puzzled both about what the phrase means and what writing it refers to.

The text of Aristotle'sEthica Eudemia is often in need of emendation, especially because of the particular fault in the manuscripts of misreading one letter for another or misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in correcting many of these errors, but more needs to be done. A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or grammar, but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, as scholars have noted, theEEis marked (...) by considerable compression of thought, and this compression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration, it can be shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed. (shrink)

I contend that s. Haack's proposed definition of fallibilism is unsatisfactory being equivalent to the assertion that we can believe anything. I say that fallibilism is best conceived as the doctrine that all our theories are false.